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GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER V. SUPERIOR
COURT REVISITED: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
AND PROPOSAL RESPECTING AN
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO CROSS-COMPLAIN FOR
COMPARATIVE INDEMNITY AGAINST THE
FORMER CLIENT'S PRESENT ATTORNEY.
Jerome I. Braun*
I.

INTRODUCTION

California began its shift to a system of comparative negligence when the California Supreme Court abrogated the
doctrine of contributory negligence in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of
California.' Because Li dealt with the relatively simple fact
situation of a single plaintiff suing a single defendant, the
court expressly left open the questions of liability and damage
apportionment among multiple defendants.
American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court2
(AMA) provided some basic answers to those questions. In
AMA, the supreme court held that the system of comparative
negligence established in Li provided, in appropriate cases,
the right of partial or comparative indemnity' among multiple
tortfeasors. AMA in effect permitted a negligent defendant to
cross-complain for total or partial indemnity against an alleged joint or concurrent tortfeasor, whether already a party
© 1982 by Jerome I. Braun.
* A.B., 1951, Stanford University; LL.B., 1953, Stanford University. The author
is a partner with the law firm of Farella, Braun & Martel.
The observations in this Article are the author's sole responsibility. Thanks and
appreciation are due to several colleagues who labored long and hard at this enterprise. They are Stephen Cone, Daniel Petree, Roderick McLeod and Pamela Covella,
without whose assistance this piece would not have come to fruition.
1. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
2. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
3. The terms "partial indemnity" and "comparative indemnity" are used interchangeably in the AMA decision. See 20 Cal. 3d at 583-84, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal.
Rptr. at 185.
4. The terms "joint tortfeasor" and "concurrent tortfeasor" at one time denoted
relationships distinct from each other. Tortfeasors are joint when they "owe to an-

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

to the action or not. Like Li, however, AMA left many questions unanswered, including the applicability of the comparative indemnity rules to attorney malpractice actions.
Attorney malpractice suits are becoming increasingly
common. Such suits, like negligence actions in general, present the potential for claims of joint liability among multiple
defendants, including claims for indemnity by one lawyer
against another. One of the more common situations for such
a claim was presented in the relatively recent case of Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher v. Superior Court,6 in which the specific issue was whether an attorney sued for malpractice by a former
client could file a cross-complaint for partial indemnity
against the plaintiff's present attorney.
In Gibson, the California Court of Appeal, in a two to one
decision, held that the lawyer, defendant in a malpractice action cannot cross-complaint for partial indemnity against the
plaintiff-former client's attorney, even though the present attorney's conduct may have aggravated the plaintiff's damage.
While it acknowledged that such a cross-complaint falls under
the basic rubric of a comparative negligence indemnity claim,
the majority cited certain policy considerations which it felt
distinguished the attorney malpractice case from other negligence actions.
This Article argues that Gibson was wrongly decided.'
other the same duty and by their common neglect such other is injured .... "
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 973 (5th ed. 1979). Concurrent tortfeasors have been defined as follows:
Where the independent acts of several persons contribute to the
injury, the wrongdoers are not joint tortfeasors, and are more properly
characterized as concurrent tortfeasors or successive tortfeasors.
• . .The wrongful acts may actually be simultaneous or concurrent
• . .The acts may, however, be successive in point of time, one oc
curring before the other.
4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 34, at 2332-33 (8th ed. 1974). This distinction, however, has been blurred in the case law. See, e.g., Leaf v. City of San
Mateo, 204 Cal. App. 3d 398, 163 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1980). See generally W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS §§ 50-51 (4th ed. 1971). The analysis to follow applies to either of the
two terms. Consequently, various uses of the different labels in the cases to be analyzed below will be ignored.
5. 94 Cal. App. 3d 347, 156 Cal. Rptr. 326, hearing denied, (1979).
6. See Note, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher v. Superior Court: The Attorney's Right
to Cross-Complain for Equitable Indemnification From an Opposing Attorney, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 171 (1979) [hereinafter The Attorney's Right], for a discussion and
critique of the Gibson case. The present article is intended to pick up where that
casenote left off, both as to criticism of the Gibson case and recommendations for
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Gibson flies in the face of the loss distribution principles of Li
and AMA and reverses the trend in California denying special
protection to attorneys in their role qua attorneys.7 This Article's thesis is that the particular conflict of interest considered
by the Gibson court is no different than the other conflicts of
interest which lawyers face daily. Such conflicts can, with the
informed consent of the client, be dealt with under the existing rules of professional responsibility.8
Following this Introduction, Part II discusses the facts of
Gibson. Part III defines the conflict of interest which formed
the basis for the Gibson holding, while Part IV summarizes
rectifying it.
7. The following is a modest catalogue of decisions highlighting the trend:
(i) Statute of limitations: Originally the statute commenced to run from the date
of the negligent act irrespective of the date of discovery of damages. Alter v. Michael,
64 Cal. 2d 480, 413 P.2d 153, 50 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1966); Yandell v. Baker, 258 Cal. App.
2d 308, 65 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1968). Thereafter, the accrual rule was judicially changed:
the statute does not commence to run until discovery or the suffering of appreciable
damage. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfund, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d
421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971); Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 491 P.2d 433, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 849 (1971);
(ii) Liability to non-client for attorney's opinions: Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart,
Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976) (attorney liable for
failure to disclose material information in an opinion letter intended for use by nonclient);
(iii) Vicarious liability: Blackmon v. Hale, 1 Cal. 3d 548, 463 P.2d 418, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 194 (1970) (legal partnership liable for a tortious wrong or a contractual breach
committed by a former partner subsequent to former partner's withdrawal);
(iv) Legal Research: Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr.
621 (1975) (attorney liable for failure to perform research into question of community
property character of plaintiff's husband's retirement benefits although law uncertain
and research of questions would have produced no definitive answer);
(v) Attorney testifying in client's action: Comden v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d
906, 576 P.2d 971, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978) (Where attorney is likely to be called as a
witness the attorney and his firm must withdraw from representation of the client.).
The Comden decision and its harsh consequences have been modified by Rule 2-111
of the California Rules of Professional Conduct.
(vi) Malicious prosecution: Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr.
237 (1975) (There may be a cause of action for malicious prosecution against an attorney who prosecutes a claim which a reasonable attorney would not regard as tenable
or proceeds with action by unreasonably neglecting to investigate facts and law. The
court failed to identify the necessary element of malice, suggesting that something
less than actual malice is required in a malicious prosecution action against an attorney.); and,
(vii) Liability to non-client testamentary beneficiaries: Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal.
2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962) (lack
of privity between beneficiaries of will and attorney who drew will did not preclude
beneficiaries from maintaining action against attorney for a negligently drawn will).
8. See note 67 infra.
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the majority's holding in Gibson. The holding is then critically
analyzed in Part V. Part VI discusses Gibson's impact, if its
holding remains uncorrected, and offers an alternative suggestion for handling the Gibson conflict of interest. Part VII concludes the Article.

II.

GIBSON FACTS'

Gibson's indemnity issue had its genesis in a 1972 transaction in which Schlumberger Limited guaranteed to Union
Bank repayment of the bank's loan to Schlumberger's then
wholly owned subsidiary, Virtue Brothers Manufacturing Co.
Inc. (VBM). The loan was purportedly secured by personal
property of VBM. Schlumberger's legal counsel in the transaction was the law firm of Kindel & Anderson (Kindel).
When VBM subsequently defaulted, Schlumberger repaid
Union Bank pursuant to its guaranty. Union Bank in return
assigned to Schlumberger the security interests which VBM
had purportedly conveyed to it.
When Schlumberger sought to enforce the security interests, VBM filed a petition for reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act. In the bankruptcy proceedings, VBM's other creditors challenged the validity of the security interests. To
resolve this dispute, Schlumberger retained the law firms of
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (hereinafter Gibson) and another
firm. With Gibson's assistance, Schlumberger eventually settled the dispute.
Subsequently, Schlumberger, represented by Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher only, filed suit against Union Bank and
against Schlumberger's prior counsel, Kindel. The complaint
alleged that Union Bank and Kindel were negligent in failing
to provide valid and enforceable security interests in connection with the 1972 transaction and in failing to advise
Schlumberger of the risk that the security interests might not
be enforceable. Schlumberger alleged that as a result of this
negligence, it was forced to settle with VBM's other creditors
for approximately $1,000,000 less than it would have received
if the security interests had been valid and enforceable.
Union Bank and Kindel in turn filed a cross-complaint
for comparative indemnity against Gibson. They charged that
9. All of the factual material in this part is drawn from the Gibson decision. 94
Cal. App. 3d at 349-51, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 327-28.
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Gibson's representation of Schlumberger in the bankruptcy
proceedings was negligent and that Gibson's negligence contributed to the loss which Schlumberger had allegedly sustained. In effect, Union Bank and Kindel alleged that the settlement between Schlumberger and VBM's other creditors
was unreasonable, and that Gibson could have obtained a
more favorable settlement, thereby obviating the need for a
suit against Union Bank and Kindel, or at least diminishing
their monetary exposure. The effect of these cross-claims was
that the defendants sought indemnification from Schlumberger's present counsel, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher.
Gibson demurred to Union Bank's cross-complaint on the
ground that it failed to state a cause of action. That demurrer
was overruled and Gibson sought a writ of mandate to compel
dismissal of the cross-complaint. Pursuant to an agreement
among the parties, Gibson did not respond to Kindel's crosscomplaint. The appellate court, however, treated Kindel as a
real party in interest since Kindel's cross-complaint presented
the identical legal issues raised in Union Bank's crosscomplaint.
In the court of appeal, Union Bank and Kindel argued
that AMA's rule allowing partial indemnity among concurrent
tortfeasors was controlling. Having alleged that Gibson's negligence contributed to Schlumberger's loss, Union Bank and
Kindel argued that if found liable to Schlumberger, they were
entitled to at least partial indemnity from Gibson. The majority of the court in Gibson refused to apply AMA's loss distribution principles because of a perceived conflict between
those principles and the unique nature of the attorney-client
relationship.

III.

THE ISSUE DEFINED

Gibson involved a scenario in which a client hired an attorney (Lawyer II) to assist in extricating the client from a
situation created in part by its former attorney (Lawyer I).
Lawyer II then negotiated a settlement which resolved the
problem created by Lawyer I. Thereafter, on the advice of
Lawyer II, the client sued Lawyer I for malpractice. Lawyer I
cross-complained for comparative indemnity against Lawyer
II, alleging that Lawyer II was negligent in resolving the problem and that Lawyer II's negligence contributed to the client's
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damage.'"
The majority of the court in Gibson refused to permit the
cross-complaint, stating that the existence of such a cause of
action would create the potential for an intolerable conflict of
interest on the part of Lawyer II. That conflict of interest
would arise because Lawyer II has a duty to advise his client
as to the various alternatives available for extricating the client from the situation created by Lawyer I. The possible alternatives, each of which will have certain attractions and certain drawbacks, will usually include, among others, a possible
lawsuit against Lawyer I. Thus, the alternatives must be
weighed by the client and by Lawyer II to determine which
approach is in the best interests of the client.
If Lawyer II is faced with the possibility of a comparative
indemnity claim by Lawyer I, a new factor may enter into
Lawyer II's evaluation of the available alternatives: whether
those alternatives may expose Lawyer II to a lawsuit and the
concomittant burden of defending it. While this is a factor
which is of extreme importance to Lawyer II, it is obviously
irrelevant to the question of what approach best serves the
client. Thus, Lawyer II's interest in avoiding personal exposure to a lawsuit creates a potential conflict with the client's
best interest. It was this particular conflict of interest (hereinafter the consultative conflict) which concerned the Gibson
court."
10. In Gibson, the problem which Lawyer II was called upon to resolve was
created both by Lawyer I and by Union Bank. In framing the issue, the Gibson majority recognized that the issue is the same whether the cross-complainant is a lawyer
or a non-lawyer. For convenience, the court labeled the cross-complainants "Lawyer
I." 94 Cal. App. 3d at 352, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 329. Consequently, this discussion will
follow that form.
11. There are several permutations of the Gibson model. They are not dealt
with here, but for purposes of symmetry, they should be mentioned. Thus, if the
client sues Lawyer II (rather than Lawyer I, as was the case in Gibson), and Lawyer
II thereafter cross-complains against Lawyer I seeking comparative indemnity or equitable contribution, the consultative conflict which concerned the Gibson court does
not exist, since Lawyer I's representation has ceased. The problems of attorney-client
privilege and confidential communication, however, remain and will have to be resolved by the pragmatics of litigation and whether or not the client, as the holder of
the privilege, chooses to waive the privilege or whether some other exception to the
privilege would apply.
Another model is where Lawyer I and Lawyer II are co-counsel and either or
both are sued by the common client. These are presumably partnership or joint venture questions governed not by Gibson or its rationale, but by the substantive law of
partnerships. See Pollack v. Lytle, 120 Cal. App. 3d 931, 175 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1981)
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IV.

THE GIBSON COURT'S ANALYSIS

The majority in Gibson decided that the only way to
avoid the consultative conflict was to preclude the possibility
of a suit by Lawyer I against Lawyer II. In the words of the
court: "Lawyer II should not be required to face a potential
conflict between the course which is in his client's best interest and the course which would minimize his exposure to the
cross-complaint of [L]awyer I.' '12 While the protection of the

client from the effects of the consultative conflict is clearly
warranted, Gibson went too far. There is no need to sacrifice
the goal of AMA to obtain the goal of Gibson when an alternative exists which sacrifices neither.
The majority of the court in Gibson began its analysis by
distinguishing AMA in two respects, one of which was viewed
as critical. First, AMA dealt with a single indivisible injury.
By contrast, the harm suffered by Schlumberger involved
"successive acts, each of which had a discernible effect contributing to the ultimate loss."'" The court concluded, however, that this factual difference was insignificant. In support
of this conclusion, the court cited medical malpractice cases
involving successive tortious acts in which partial indemnification had been permitted among parties who had made separate contributions to the same injury."
The court's second distinction concerned the effect of a
cross-complaint on the attorney-client relationship and the essence of that relationship, viz, the attorney's duty of undivided loyalty to the client in trying to resolve the problem created by the prior attorney.'5 In formulating and analyzing the
(One co-counsel can sue another for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and declaratory
relief respecting a right to indemnity in connection with the other attorney's handling
of a medical malpractice action for a common client.). Compare Ortiz v. Barrett, 278
S.E.2d 833 (Va. 1981) (a local attorney engaged to perform services on an hourly basis
for an out of state attorney who acted as "lead" counsel was not liable for the negligence of the latter) with Tormo v. Yormark, 398 F. Supp. 1159 (D.N.J. 1975) (an out
of state referring attorney responsible for the negligence in retaining local counsel).
12. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 356, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
13. Id. at 351, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
14. Id. at 352, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 329. See Niles v. City of San Rafael, 42 Cal.
App. 3d 230, 116 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1974); Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38
Cal. Rptr. 490 (1964).
15. Before focusing on the critical issue, the Gibson majority first noted that
"[tihe most conspicuous consequence of a cross-complaint against the plaintiff's lawyer [Lawyer II] is to preclude that lawyer from trying the case on behalf of the plaintiff." 94 Cal. App. 3d at 352, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 329. Citing Comden v. Superior Court,
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problem, the Gibson court relied heavily on the earlier supreme court decision in Goodman v. Kennedy's and the appellate decision in Held v. Arant.' Thus, to understand Gibson, both Goodman and Held must be reviewed.
Goodman presented the issue of whether an attorney's
duty of care in advising the client extended to third persons
with whom the client deals at arm's length. In Goodman, the
plaintiffs sued the defendant-attorney, Kennedy, to recover
losses which they had incurred on shares of stock purchased
from Kennedy's clients, who were the principal officers of the
corporation issuing the stock.' s
The plaintiffs claimed that Kennedy was professionally
negligent in incorrectly advising the clients that the stock
could be issued by the corporation and sold by them without
adverse consequences to subsequent purchasers under Securities Exchange Commission regulations." The plaintiffs argued
that Kennedy should be liable to them because his advice was
directly related to a possible sale of the stock and thus the
purchase and resultant injury were foreseeable consequences
of the negligent advice.2 0 Essentially, plaintiffs' theory postulated that an attorney's duty of care in advising a client extends not only to the client, but also to those who foreseeably
will be injured or damaged if the client follows the advice.
The California Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' theory, both on the facts and for policy reasons. The court found
that Kennedy owed no duty to the plaintiffs. In that factual
milieu, the court noted the lack of any allegation that Ken20 Cal. 3d 906, 576 P.2d 971, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978), the Gibson court downplayed
the importance of the client's right to be represented by counsel of his choice.
Comden held that whenever trial counsel determines that he or she ought to
testify, or is likely to testify, on behalf of the client, both the trial counsel and his or
her entire law firm must withdraw as trial counsel. The Comden decision was changed
by the 1979 revision of Rule 2-111 of the California Rules of Professional Responsibility. Rule 2-111 explicitly overrules the Comden recusal holding, providing that only
where the attorney may potentially be a witness against the interests of that attorney's client is recusal mandatory. (See Rule 2-111(5)). As a practical matter in the
Gibson scenario, it would be a rare case indeed where Lawyer II would not be called
as an adverse witness under the provisions of section 776 of the California Evidence
Code. Whether or not this likelihood alone requires recusal of Lawyer II, his firm or
both, is far from clear.
16. 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976).
17. 67 Cal. App. 3d 748, 134 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1977).
18. 18 Cal. 3d at 339, 556 P.2d at 740, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 344, 556 P.2d at 742, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
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nedy's advice had ever been communicated to the plaintiffs,
thereby making untenable any claim that the plaintiffs relied
on the advice in purchasing the stock.21 In addition, the court
pointed out that Kennedy did not give the advice for the purpose of enabling his clients to discharge some obligation to the
plaintiffs. Accordingly, the court found that there was no relationship between Kennedy and the plaintiffs which could give
22
rise to any duty to plaintiffs.

Despite these factual reasons for denying the cause of action, the plaintiffs argued that they were, in effect, intended
beneficiaries of Kennedy's advice because the advice was "intended to affect" them as purchasers and because harm to
them was foreseeable. The court also rejected this factual argument on the ground that the arm's length nature of the
transaction precluded a finding that the plaintiffs were in23
tended beneficiaries of Kennedy's advice.
A close reading of the Goodman opinion, however, reveals
that the court based its decision primarily on the policy goal
of protecting the attorney-client relationship. Extending an
attorney's liability for negligent advice to those with whom
the client deals at arm's length would, in the words of the
court,
inject undesirable self-protective reservations into the attorney's counselling role. The attorney's preoccupation or
concern with the possibility of claims based on mere negligence (as distinct from fraud or malice) by any with
whom his client might deal 'would prevent him from devoting his entire energies to his client's interests [citation
omitted] '24
In other words, the court in Goodman sought to prevent the

potential conflict of duty which would likely arise if the attor21. Id. at 343, 556 P.2d at 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381. Citing Roberts v. Ball,
Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976), the
Goodman court expressly distinguished the situation
in which an attorney gives his client a written opinion with the intention
that it be transmitted to and relied upon by the plaintiff in dealing with

the client. In that situation, the attorney owes the plaintiff a duty of
care in providing the advice because the plaintiff's anticipated reliance

upon it is 'the end and aim of the transaction' [citation omitted].
18 Cal. 3d at 343 n.4, 556 P.2d at 743 n.4, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381 n.4.
22. 18 Cal. 3d at 343-44, 556 P.2d at 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
23. Id. at 344, 556 P.2d at 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
24. Id.
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ney had both a duty to advise the client and a duty to protect
those with whom the client later deals at arm's length on the
basis of that advice.2 5
The second case relied upon by the Gibson court was
Held v. Arant,2' which bears a striking factual resemblance to
Gibson. Like Gibson, Held involved the attorney's duty to a
client and the question of whether an attorney, sued for malpractice by the client, has a right of indemnity against the
client's subsequent attorney.
In Held, the plaintiff-client Held had retained defendantattorney Arant (Lawyer I) to represent him in a business
transaction with Nova-Tech. The transaction aborted and
Nova-Tech sued Held for misrepresentation. Held settled the
suit by Nova-Tech with the assistance of subsequent counsel
(Lawyer II). On the advice and with the further assistance of
Lawyer II, Held then brought suit against Lawyer I for malpractice. Lawyer I in turn cross-complained against Lawyer II,
asserting that Lawyer II had committed malpractice in representing Held in the settlement, thereby exacerbating, rather
than reducing, Held's initial loss. Lawyer I thus sought indemnity from Lawyer II in the event Lawyer I was found liable to Held. 7
The court affirmed the dismissal of Lawyer I's cross-complaint, noting that "the lawyer's duty of care extends only to
the intended beneficiaries of his action."2 8 Since the crosscomplaint on its face showed that Lawyer I was not an intended beneficiary of Lawyer II's representation of the client,
Lawyer II therefore owed no duty to Lawyer 1.'9
Because Arant (Lawyer I) raised no other theory, the
court could have disposed of the case on the ground that Lawyer II owed no duty to Lawyer I. The court, however, considered the factual issues to have broad implications for the attorney-client relationship. Therefore, it requested argument
25. The conflict of duty which the court sought to avoid in Goodman should not
be confused with the conflict of interest which was the focus of Gibson. See text
accompanying notes 61-63 infra.
26. 67 Cal. App. 3d 748, 134 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1977).
27. Id. at 750-51, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 422-23.
28. Id. at 751, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
29. Id. at 751, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 423. See Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917,
123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975); National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Atkins, 45 Cal. App. 3d
562, 119 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1975). See also Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown &
Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976).
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on the critical issue of whether successive acts of legal malpractice should give rise to a cause of action for equitable indemnity between attorneys."0
Expressly noting that the parties had waived any question of comparative indemnity,3 ' the court focused on the doctrine of equitable indemnity, which permits a passively negligent tortfeasor to seek full indemnity from an actively
negligent tortfeasor3 2 Specifically, the court addressed the applicability of certain personal injury cases involving medical
malpractice to the legal malpractice scenario presented in
Held.
The court noted that in personal injury actions, the originally negligent tortfeasor is entitled to equitable indemnity
from the subsequent treating physician for that portion of
damage caused by the physician's negligence. 3 The questionable rationale for allowing such indemnity in medical malpractice cases is that the possibility of a suit for indemnity
supposedly does not inhibit the physician's performance of his
professional duty to his patient. In other words, the threat of
a later indemnity claim for malpractice does not influence either the physician's choice of treatment or the quality of his
30. 67 Cal. App. 3d at 751-52, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
31. Id. at 751 n.2, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 423 n.2. The lack of a comparative negligence issue in Held obviously prevents that case from fitting precisely into the Gibson
mold. Nevertheless, as suggested below, the two cases are similar enough that both
must be discussed and analyzed in detail.
32. E.g., Niles v. City of San Rafael, 42 Cal. App. 3d 230, 238-39, 116 Cal. Rptr.
733, 737-38 (1974); Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74-76, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490,
493-95 (1964).
33. 67 Cal. App. 3d at 751-52, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 423. Note that in this situation
the negligent acts of the original tortfeasor and the subsequent treating physician
must be separate and distinct. See Niles v. City of San Rafael, 42 Cal. App. 3d 230,
240, 116 Cal. Rptr. 733, 738. As to the initial tortious act, the original tortfeasor alone
is liable. As to the aggravation of the injury caused by the treating physician, the
original tortfeasor is secondarily or passively liable while the physician is primarily or
actively liable. Thus, the original tortfeasor is entitled to full equitable indemnity,
but only for that portion of the injury caused by the physician.
Likewise, in Held, Lawyer I sought full equitable indemnity only for that portion
of the client's damage for which Lawyer II was primarily liable. Thus, Held did not
involve the precise AMA goal of loss distribution based on pure comparative fault.
Nevertheless, it did involve a balancing of the general concept of equitable loss distribution and the goal of avoiding the consultative conflict. Accordingly, the Held decision was considered virtually dispositive in Gibson. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher v.
Superior Court, 94 Cal. App. 3d at 347, 355, 156 Cal. Rptr. 326, 331. It is argued
herein that both Held and Gibson suffer from the same flaw: the failure to consider
less drastic ways of protecting the client from the effects of the consultative conflict.
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performance."' In the words of the Held court: "Whatever
may be the effect of exposure to malpractice suits upon the
performance of good medicine, it exists irrespective of the indemnity potential." 5 Implicit in this rationale is the belief
that the physician's performance of his duties in accordance
with professional standards will protect him from liability.
The court in Held concluded that legal malpractice cases
warrant a contrary result. The court stated that the possibility
of an indemnity claim against Lawyer II could "impinge upon
the individual loyalty owed by counsel."" The court perceived
that the potential for an indemnity claim would present Lawyer II with a conflict of interest.
Lawyer II was faced with a professional consultative
choice between possible courses of conduct. Where one alternative in that choice leads to the possibility of an indemnity
suit against Lawyer II and the other alternative does not, the
court expressed concern that the lawyer's judgment regarding
the client's interest 7could be influenced by the lawyer's self
8
protective concerns.

34. This conclusion is, at the very least, highly suspect. Studies in the medical
malpractice field suggest that physicians face a conflict very similar to the consultative conflict which faced Lawyer II in Gibson. The fear of malpractice suits by patients has resulted in the practice by physicians of "defensive medicine." Tancredi &
Barondess, The Problem of Defensive Medicine, 200 SCIENCE 879 (1978) [hereinafter
Tancredi]; Garg, Gliebe & Elkhatib, The Extent of Defensive Medicine: Some Empirical Evidence, 6 LEGAL ASPECTS OF MED. PRACTICE 25 (February 1978); U.S. DEP'T
OF H.E.W., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, Publication No. (05) 73-89, 38-40 (1973) [hereinafter H.E.W. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE]. Defensive medicine actually encompasses two different patterns of
conduct. "Positive" defensive medicine involves "the over-utilization of diagnostic
and treatment procedures which are medically unjustified." Id. at A38; see Shavell,
Theoretical Issues in Medical Malpractice, (1978) THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 49 (S. Rottenberg ed.); Schwartz & Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1282 (1978); Note, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A
Study of Defensive Medicine, 5 DUKE L.J. 939 (1971). "Negative" defensive medicine
involves "the withholding of diagnostic or therapeutic techniques that might be medically justified in light of the patient's physical condition but are accompanied by
more than the usual risk of an adverse outcome ....
" Tancredi at 879; see H.E.W.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE at A38. With both types of defensive medicine, the purpose is
the same: avoidance of a medical malpractice claim. Tancredi at 879; H.E.W. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE at A38. Thus, contrary to the conclusion of the Gibson and Held
courts, physicians (like lawyers in the position of Lawyer II) are faced with the conflict of choosing between the course which is best for the patient (client) or choosing
the course which best avoids a lawsuit.
35. 67 Cal. App. 3d at 752, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
36. Id.
37. In characterizing the position of the lawyer as being fraught with conflict
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Thus, in the Held court's judgment, Lawyer II, unlike the
physician, must do more than perform well.38 Lawyer II must
make a professional evaluation whether to sue the previous
lawyer or pursue other alternatives and make a recommendation as to which alternative to pursue. Lawyer II can, therefore, avoid an indemnity suit by choosing not to sue Lawyer I
regardless of whether or not that choice is in the client's best
interest.3 9 Thus, because an indemnity claim would have an
adverse effect on the attorney-client relationship, the court in
Held concluded that Lawyer I should not be allowed to seek
indemnity from Lawyer

11.40

The Gibson majority, in reaching the same conclusion as
Held, relied on those aspects of the Goodman and Held cases
discussed above. Expanding on Goodman's prohibition against
attorney malpractice claims by a client's arm's length adversary, the Gibson majority characterized the important policy
considerations as follows:
[T]o expose the attorney to actions for negligence brought
by parties other than the client, 'would inject undesirable
self-protective reservations into the attorney's counselling
role' and tend to divert the attorney from single-minded
devotion to his client's interests. 4'
In adopting the Held rationale in toto, the Gibson court
expressed the view that the Held rationale is even more persuasive in a comparative negligence situation than it was in
Held's equitable indemnity situation. As stated by the Gibson
the court said:
[If it (Lawyer II) chooses the course of resistance of the claim, it will be
immune from liability to the one adversary absent malicious prosecution
(Daly v. Smith) (1963) 220 Cal. App. 2d 592, 604, 33 Cal. Rptr. 920),
while if it chooses the course of prosecuting the client's claim for malpractice against a prior attorney it may be subject to a claim to indemnify that attorney.
67 Cal. App. 3d at 752, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
38. The question of whether there is, in fact, a difference in the conflict
presented to the physician and that presented to the attorney is discussed at note 34
supra. Nevertheless, the purported distinction is relevant at this juncture to highlight
the concerns, whether valid or not, in Held and Gibson.
39. Furthermore, as alluded to in Gibson, even if Lawyer II acquits his duty to
the client by choosing to sue Lawyer I, there may be an indemnity suit by Lawyer I,
who is likely to cross-complain against Lawyer II regardless of the merits of the crossclaim.
40. 67 Cal. App. 3d at 752-53, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
41. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 353, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
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court:
What was said in Held v. Arant is quite as applicable
to indemnification under the comparative negligence
standards. Since American Motorcycle has greatly expanded the opportunities for defendants in negligence
cases to seek indemnification from parties whom the
plaintiff did not choose to sue, the hazard to the attorneyclient relationship could now be vastly greater than it was
under the substantive law previously in effect. 4'
In an effort to dissuade the court in Gibson that Goodman and Held should not be followed, the cross-complaining
parties (the bank and Lawyer I) urged that their cross-complaints would not impinge on the attorney-client relationship
because all they sought was to acquit Lawyer II's duty to the
client. s In rejecting this argument, the majority stated:
The problem is not that Lawyer II may be found liable to
his client for malpractice. It is that in satisfying the needs
and desires of his client, lawyer II may be exposing himself to the not insubstantial cost of defending an action
by his client's opponent.
A client seeking to extricate himself from a situation
caused by the negligence of lawyer I may find his options
limited both by legal constraints and practical considerations. The client's perception of his own best interests, after obtaining sound legal advice, may dictate a course
which lawyer I may fairly characterize as 'unreasonable
and disproportionate to the risk involved.' What effect a
settlement so motivated would have on the client's claim
against lawyer I is not before us. What is pertinent here is
the effect upon the relationship between lawyer II and the
client when the client's alternatives are under consideration. Lawyer II should not be required to face a potential
conflict between the course which is in his client's best
interest and the course which would minimize his exposure to the cross-complaint of lawyer I."
Finally, Lawyer I argued that its cross-complaint should
be permitted because suits for malpractice are a risk of professional life which "should not be regarded as a serious inhi42.
43.
44.

Id. at 355, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
Id.
Id. at 355-56, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
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bition upon professional loyalty and objectivity."4' 5 With respect to malpractice claims by dissatisfied clients, the Gibson
court agreed. With respect to claims by client's adversaries,
however, the court disagreed, choosing to rely on the rationale
of Goodman and Held that "exposure to the client's potential
adversaries 'would prevent [Lawyer II] from devoting his entire energies to his client's interests.' ""
Accordingly, the majority in Gibson found that the relationship between attorney and client merits special protection
from the apparent juggernaut of an unlimited comparative indemnity system. The court chose to protect the client from
the effects of the consultative conflict by precluding the existence of the conflict. The trade-off for this result was the
abandonment of the important loss distribution goals of
AMA. That trade-off was neither wise nor necessary.

V.

ANALYSIS OF THE GIBSON RATIONALE

The Gibson court essentially engaged in a balancing of
two policy goals, namely the equitable loss distribution goal of
AMA and the goal of avoiding the potentially adverse effects
of the consultative conflict. In the majority's view, these two
goals conflicted. After weighing the supposedly competing policies, the court decided that AMA's equitable loss distribution
principles must give way to the goal of protecting the client
from the conflict of interest which a potential cross-complaint
thrusts upon the client's attorney (Lawyer II).
Although the discussion that follows argues that Gibson
was wrongly decided, it is important initially to recognize that
the Gibson court's mistake was not in its weighing of the respective goals. The court's mistake was its perception that
those goals are irreconcilably competing. This Article does not
disagree with the Gibson court's assumption that the client
must be given reasonable protection from the effects of the
consultative conflict. Protection of the attorney-client relationship from any potential conflict of interest is necessary if
such a relationship is to retain its value in an adversarial system of justice. Such protection, however, can be achieved
without sacrificing the goal of equitable loss distribution. The
total preclusion of otherwise legitimate indemnity claims is
45.
46.

Id. at 356, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
Id. at 356, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 331-32.
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too high a price to exact for such protection when less drastic,
but equally effective, alternatives exist.
A.

The Equitable Loss Distribution Goal

The AMA case involved the equitable distribution of an
indivisible loss among joint or concurrent tortfeasors. 7 The
crux of the AMA decision is that a joint or concurrent
tortfeasor may obtain partial indemnity on a comparative
fault basis against any fellow joint or concurrent tortfeasors,
whether or not a party to the initial action. The purpose of
this holding is to implement fully the goal of Li v. Yellow Cab:
the achievement of "a system under which liability for damage will be borne by those whose negligence caused it in direct
proportion to their respective fault."'4 8 While the court
in AMA recognized that there were exceptions to the general
principles of comparative fault loss distribution, 9 it is nonetheless clear that those general principles embody a policy
goal of extreme importance and general, widespread application.5 0
47. The Gibson court also recognized that the principles of AMA apply to successive tortfeasors, so long as the injury or loss is indivisible. See text accompanying
notes 13 & 14 supra. If successive tortfeasors cause distinct and separable injuries,
equitable loss distribution is achieved through the pre-AMA rules relating to equitable indemnity. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra.
48. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 813, 532 P.2d 1226, 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 864 (1975).
49. The AMA court expressly mentioned two such circumstances. The first is
where an employee is injured in the scope of his employment. In such a case, California Labor Code § 3864 would, in the words of the court, "normally preclude a third
party tortfeasor from obtaining indemnification from the employer, even if the employer's negligence was a concurrent cause of the injury." 20 Cal. 3d 578, 607 n.9, 578
P.2d 899, 917 n.9, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 200-01 n.9. The second exception noted by the
AMA court was where one concurrent tortfeasor has entered into a good faith settlement with the plaintiff. To allow a cross-complaint in that situation would "undermine the explicit statutory policy to encourage settlements reflected by the provisions
of § 877 of the Code of Civil Procedure." Id. When and under what circumstances one
can attack a settlement as not in "good faith" is another subject beyond the scope of
this article. For the most recent word on the subject, see Cardio Sys., Inc. v. Superior
Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981). But see, the dramatic decision
of Baget v. Shepard (decided Feb. 2, 1982) (Cal. Ct. App.) holding, with one judge
dissenting, that aside from and notwithstanding the "good faith" exception of § 877
(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff's recovery should be reduced "by the
percentage amount of responsibility attributable to the settling tortfeasors' tortious
conduct" rather than by the "amount stipulated by the release" (emphasis in
original).
50. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 607-08, 578
P.2d at 918, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 201. See also Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal.
3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. International
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Because Gibson involved an indivisible injury among allegedly successive tortfeasors, the court focused exclusively on
the comparative indemnity principles of AMA. As exemplified
by Held, however, the consultative conflict can arise in other
than an AMA context. Held involved an allegedly divisible injury caused by successive tortfeasors. 51 Thus, the Held court
was concerned with total equitable indemnity rather than
comparative (or partial equitable) indemnity.
Nevertheless, in both Held and Gibson, the essential goal
being weighed was that of equitable loss distribution. That
goal is equally important, whether the injury is divisible or
indivisible. In the context of the consultative conflict analysis,
therefore, Gibson and Held presented the same issue. While
the majority in Gibson apparently recognized this identity of
issues, 52 it made the same mistake as did the Held court in
abandoning the goal of equitable loss distribution. 8
B.

The Goal Of Avoiding The Consultative Conflict

In Gibson, the professional choice of whether to sue Lawyer I or pursue other alternatives was central to the delineation of the Gibson consultative conflict. The court's concern in
Gibson was based on the assumption that Lawyer II is more
likely to be exposed to suit if Lawyer II recommends actions
against Lawyer I, than if Lawyer II recommends pursuit of
other alternatives.
There are two reasons for this concern. First, the likelihood of the client bringing a separate malpractice action
against Lawyer II may be lessened where Lawyer II has recommended alternatives other than suit against Lawyer I because the client is unaware of the possibility of such a malHarvester Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 492, 147 Cal. Rptr. 262, hearing denied, (1978).
51. See note 33 supra.
52. Id.
53. The post-AMA decision in Commercial Standard Title Co., Inc. v. Superior
Court, 92 Cal. App. 3d 934, 155 Cal. Rptr. 393, hearing denied, (1979), also seems to
ignore the principles of equitable loss distribution in the face of a possible crosscomplaint against the plaintiff's attorney. In fact, Commercial Standard presents a
situation materially different from Gibson and Held. Commercial Standard raised
the question of whether the plaintiff's prior attorney can be subjected to a crosscomplaint, while Gibson and Held involved a cross-complaint against the plaintiff's
present or subsequent attorney. The difference is that in the Commercial Standard
situation, the consultative conflict does not exist. See note 11 supra.
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practice action.5 4 If Lawyer I were sued, on the other hand,

Lawyer I would presumably be forced to explore all possible
defenses, including a potential cross-complaint against Lawyer
II. Second, client inertia may also present an impediment to
an action brought by the client against Lawyer II. Even if the
client becomes fully aware of the potential for action against
Lawyer II, the client may decide against such an action because of the expense and inconvenience of instituting a second
lawsuit. Accordingly, consultative conflict is only found in the
situation of a direct juxtaposition of two choices for Lawyer
II, one of which includes suit against a previous lawyer and
one of which does not.
This is underscored by Parker v. Morton,55 decided subsequent to Gibson. Parker produced a loss sharing result consistent with AMA, while distinguishing Gibson as being inapplicable. In Parker, the client brought an action against
Lawyer I for alleged negligence in failing to litigate in a marriage dissolution action the client's community property interest in her husband's vested military pension. Lawyer I filed a
cross-complaint for total or partial indemnity against the second attorney who, after being hired by the client, allegedly
was negligent in failing to remedy the problem of the unlitigated and undisposed military pension. Though Parker involved a suit against Lawyer I for negligence in the underlying
action, the cross-claim specified that the charges against Lawyer II were not aimed at Lawyer II's choice of whether or not
to sue Lawyer I. Lawyer II had no choice in the classic Gibson
sense of whether or not to pursue alternatives other than suit
against Lawyer I. It was clear that even though suit was
brought against Lawyer I, other actions to mitigate the client's damage should have been pursued. Thus, Lawyer II's
54. See The Attorney's Right, supra note 6, at 182. The consequences of the
client remaining unaware of claims against Lawyer II are diminished by the provisions of CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 340.6 (West 1954 & Supp. 1981). Most importantly,
the statute provides several exceptions to the limitations period for an action against
an attorney. If the attorney wilfully conceals facts known to the attorney which constitute the attorney's wrongful act, and if the client does not know and has no reason
to know of those facts, the limitation period is tolled. In addition, so long as the
attorney continues to represent the plaintiff regarding the matter in which the alleged
wrong occurred, the statute is tolled. Consequently, the statute of limitations minimizes the harsh result of the client being time barred because of the client's ignorance of a possible cause of action against Lawyer 1I.
55. 117 Cal. App. 3d 751, 173 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1981).
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failure to pursue those alternatives could not have been affected by a conflict of interest."
The reasoning in the Parkercase is remarkable in its similarity to the physician-successive tortfeasor paradigm which
the courts in Gibson and Held refused to follow. In terms of
that model, the Parker decision found Lawyer II to be in the
position of the physician. Lawyer II's duty was not subject to
choice. It is important to note that the lack of choice relied
upon by the Parker court was not the lack of any available
alternatives for resolving the client's dilemma. In Parker,
Lawyer II's duty was diligent prosecution of the client's unlitigated and undisposed claims. Within those boundaries of
Lawyer II's duty obviously lay a multitude of choices as to
how to proceed. The choice that was conspicuously missing in
Parker, but which was present in Gibson and Held, was the
"either-or" professional choice of whether to pursue alternatives other than suit against Lawyer I or to bring suit against
5
Lawyer I. 7

As noted above in Part IV, the majority in Gibson re56. Id. at 760, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 202-03. Another case reaching the same conclusion is Sigel v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. Rptr. 261 (Ct. App.), hearingdenied, opinion
ordered decertified (1981). In Sigel, Lawyer I failed to effect service of a complaint on
the driver of an offending vehicle and failed otherwise to prosecute diligently the suit
in the course of representing an injured automobile passenger. When sued by the
client for malpractice, Lawyer I sought to cross-complain against Lawyer II, alleging
that Lawyer II had also not been diligent in prosecuting the suit and effecting service.
As with Parker,the duty of Lawyer II in Sigel was found to be clear and independent
of any choice to sue Lawyer I. Lawyer 11 was duty bound to serve process on the
client's opponent regardless of whether suit was brought against Lawyer I. While Sigel has no precedential value following its decertification, it is perhaps significant
that the supreme court denied a hearing.
57. Parker v. Morton, 117 Cal. App. 3d 751, 173 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1981). Rowell v.
Trans Pacific Ins. Co., 94 Cal. App. 3d 818, 156 Cal. Rptr. 679, hearing denied,
(1979), is at first glance similar to Gibson, which it followed. In Rowell, the defendant
carrier was charged with misconduct in delaying payments under a disability insurance policy. The carrier sought to file a cross-complaint against the plaintiff's current
attorneys, alleging that the dilatory conduct of the attorneys and their failure to present proper supporting documents caused the delay of payment. The court in Rowell,
with little discussion, followed Gibson and Held.
While the court in Rowell addressed the consultative conflict, it appears to be
wrongly decided. Rowell was similar to Parker in that the plaintiff's attorney in
Rowell was not faced with a professional either-or choice of recommending suit
against the carrier or pursuing other alternatives. The plaintiff's attorneys in Rowell
had a duty to the client to pursue vigorously payment of the client's disability claims
and to sue the carrier if those payments were not forthcoming. No conflict could effect the lawyer's performance because there was no choice. The Rowell decision,
therefore, appears contrary to the subsequent Parker case and logically incorrect.
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solved this conflict by concluding that Lawyer I's comparative
indemnity cross-complaint should not be allowed. In so doing,
Gibson relied heavily on the earlier decisions in Goodman and
Held. Because Held presented the same issue as Gibson, it
does not assist the present analysis to dissect Held. The Gibson court merely followed Held without extending it in any
significant way.
The Goodman case, however, involved a situation dramatically different from Gibson. Given the importance of
Goodman in the Gibson majority decision,58 it is important to
explore the philosophical and policy underpinnings of Goodman. As demonstrated below, those underpinnings are sufficiently different from Gibson to render Goodman irrelevant in
dealing with the consultative conflict as presented in Gibson.
Goodman presented the issue of whether an attorney's
duty of care in advising the client extended to third persons
with whom the client deals at arm's length. The Goodman
court concluded that no such duty of care exists. In the same
vein as Goodman was Norton v. Hines" in which the issue
was whether an attorney's duty of care in advising and representioig the client extended to the client's adversary in litigation. In Norton, the client, through attorney Hines, sued Norton. Norton obtained a dismissal of the action and sued the
client for malicious prosecution. Norton also sued attorney
Hines for negligent advice to the client which foreseeably
caused injury to Norton. The suit against Hines was based on
a claimed duty owed directly from Hines to Norton.
The Norton court held the lawyer immune to suit by the
client's adversary on negligence grounds in a situation where
the client was to be judged only by the more rigorous requirements for a malicious prosecution action. A contrary result
would impel an attorney to counsel against the pursuit of otherwise viable actions, which, if lost, would only subject the client to an action for malicious prosecution while the lawyer
could be found liable on simple negligence grounds."
It is obvious that if an attorney is subjected to a duty of
care to those whom the client sues or deals with, an advisory
conflict will arise. Such a conflict, however, is quite different
58.
59.
60.

See text accompanying notes 18-25 supra.
49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, hearing denied, (1975).
See id. at 923, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
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from the consultative conflict in Gibson. In the Goodman and
Norton situation, the advisory conflict is created by the inconsistent requirements of two asserted separate duties of care
owed by the lawyer, one to the client and one to the client's
adversary. In the Gibson situation, the consultative conflict is
created by the co-existence of the attorney's duty of care to
the client and the attorney's personal interest in avoiding a
lawsuit.
Thus, Goodman and Norton present the possibility for
extension of the lawyer's duty beyond the lawyer-client relationship, whereas in Gibson, Lawyer II is faced with only a
single duty-representing the client. In short, Goodman and
Norton involved a conflict of duty, while Gibson involved a
conflict of interest.
In the Goodman-Norton context of conflict of duty, there
may be no viable option for the lawyer because the two duties
(one to the client and the ostensible one to the third party)
may be mutually exclusive. In other words, whichever duty
the lawyer performs, he breaches the other. As correctly concluded by the Goodman and Norton courts, the only way to
avoid this conflict of duty is to refuse to recognize the existence of a duty to the client's adversary.
By contrast, in the Gibson context of conflict of interest,
Lawyer II always has a viable option: Lawyer II can perform
the single duty to the client as well as possible and ignore any
parochial concern for personal exposure to Lawyer I's potential cross-claim.
Obviously, the existence of this option does not mean
that Lawyer II will always, in fact, set aside personal interests.
Moreover, the potential conflict of interest exists, even if Lawyer II does what is best for the client. Nevertheless, the existence, in the Gibson situation, of a viable option, together
with the absence of any conflict of duty, makes the GoodmanNorton approach irrelevant." Furthermore, these distinctions
render the Gibson conclusion highly suspect.
Admittedly, the goal of the Goodman and Gibson courts
is a worthy one. The courts and the legal profession in general
should strive to avoid situations which may prevent an attor61. Obviously, Goodman and Norton are also distinguishable from Gibson in
that they did not involve any question of equitable loss distribution and thus no balancing of possibly competing policies.
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ney "'from devoting his entire energies to his client's interests.'"62 In so doing, however, the majority in Gibson failed to
delve deeply enough into either the ramifications of its holding or the possibility of a less draconian solution to the consultative conflict which it faced.

VI.

AN EXTENDED ANALYSIS OF THE GIBSON CONSULTATIVE
CONFLICT AND A PROPOSAL FOR ITS RESOLUTION.

The majority in Gibson implicitly (and correctly) decided
that when they are irreconcilable, the interests of the client
should prevail over the interests of Lawyer I and Lawyer II.
The court, however, went too far in concluding (1) that the
interests of the client and the lawyers are necessarily irreconcilable, and (2) that the client's interest is best served by precluding Lawyer I's cross-complaint against Lawyer I.
In the Gibson factual model, four separate interests will
potentially be affected by the outcome of the case: the interests of Lawyer I, Lawyer II, the client and the court system.
The effect upon each of these groups should be taken into account in addressing the validity of the Gibson court's conclusions. Whether it is possible to accomodate satisfactorily all of
those interests is debatable. Any solution should, however,
have them in mind.
A.

Lawyer I

The resolution of the Gibson consultative conflict has little more than procedural consequence for Lawyer I. If the
cross-complaint against Lawyer II is permitted, either pursuant to the comparative indemnity rule of AMA or the more
general rules of equitable loss distribution, the result is that
Lawyer I's exposure will be reduced by the extent of Lawyer
II's responsibility.
The result for Lawyer I will not be significantly different,
however, if the cross-complaint against Lawyer II is not permitted. Under the general rules of agency, Lawyer II will ordinarily be regarded as an agent of the client. Thus, in a suit by
the client against Lawyer I, Lawyer I can impute Lawyer II's
62. Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d at 344, 556 P.2d at 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. at
381; Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. App. 3d at 353, 156 Cal.
Rptr. at 329.
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negligence to the client." If Lawyer II's negligence is imputable to the client, then Lawyer I can defend against the client
by claiming that the comparative negligence of the client (including Lawyer II's imputed negligence) was at least partially
responsible for the client's injury. Thus, in the absence of a
cross-complaint against Lawyer II, Lawyer I's exposure to the
client would still be limited by the extent of Lawyer I's actual
responsibility. To Lawyer I, then, it should make little difference how the Gibson consultative conflict is resolved."
B.

Lawyer II

Lawyer II has two parochial interests to protect in the
Gibson situation. First, Lawyer II wants to avoid actual liability to either the client or Lawyer I for any breach of duty to
the client. Second, Lawyer II wants to avoid being involved in
any lawsuit, whether or not it is meritorious.
The first concern has no relevance to the resolution of the
consultative conflict. Lawyer II can avoid actual liability to
the client or Lawyer I by performing all duties to the client in
a reasonable and professional manner. In the context of advising the client as to how to escape from the situation created
by Lawyer I, this means that Lawyer II, among other things,
must set aside any personal interest and do what is best for
the client. Additionally, Lawyer II must make a full and fair
disclosure to the client. This duty exists whether or not the
63. In Rowell v. Trans Pacific Ins. Co., 94 Cal. App. 3d 818, 156 Cal. Rptr. 679,
hearing denied, (1979), the court assumed that Lawyer II's negligence could be imputed to the client on the basis of agency principles.
To the extent that the cross-complainants may be successful in proving
at trial that action of the persons it seeks to name as cross-defendants
contributed to the original injury, cross-complainants' liability to plaintiff will be reduced by the principles of comparative fault. The proposed
cross-complaint shows on its face that the fault with which appellants
seek to charge cross-defendants was committed, if at all, in the course of
their employment as agents for the plaintiff.
Id. at 821, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 681. See Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 108
Cal. App. 3d 958, 166 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980). See also The Attorney's Right, supra
note 6, at 179.
64. One factor which could conceivably cause Lawyer I to prefer a cross-complaint against Lawyer II to imputed negligence against the client is the emotions of
the jury. It is possible that a jury's feelings of sympathy for the client or antipathy
towards lawyers might result in a hesitancy to saddle the client with Lawyer II's negligence. While such action by a jury would technically be improper, it would not be
surprising and would be virtually impossible to establish. Thus, Lawyer I might prefer the tactically safer route of cross-complaining against Lawyer II.
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Gibson ban against Lawyer I's cross-complaint stands.
If the cross-complaint is permitted, then Lawyer II must
make a full and fair disclosure to the client that a suit against
Lawyer I carries with it the risk of a cross-claim against Lawyer II. The consequences of that potential cross-claim, relating to continued representation, must also be explained to the
client. This is no greater burden to Lawyer II than the existing duties under the Gibson rule. Even if Lawyer I is not
permitted to cross-complain against Lawyer II, Lawyer, II
must inform the client of the possibility of a comparative negligence defense by Lawyer I and the concommitant possibility
that Lawyer I will seek to impute Lawyer II's alleged negligence to the client.
Thus, regardless of whether the cross-complaint is permitted, Lawyer II will have a duty to inform the client that a
suit against Lawyer I involves a risk that Lawyer I will charge
Lawyer II with concurrent or successive negligence in order to
reduce Lawyer I's liability to the client. Likewise, if such a
claim is made (whether by way of cross-complaint against
Lawyer II or by way of an imputed negligence defense), Lawyer II must explain the consequences of the claim to the client
and obtain written consent for the continued representation
of the client."
In short, if all duties to the client are performed in a professional manner, including his duties of disclosure, Lawyer II
will be insulated from liability by whomever asserted. Thus,
the Rules of Professional Responsibility adequately cover
Lawyer II's concern relating to actual liability."
Lawyer II's other personal interest is to avoid being
named as a defendant in litigation regardless of merit. This is
a concern of every lawyer (and client for that matter) involved
65. CAL. CIv. & CRIM. CT. RULES pt. 2 (Rules of Professional Conduct) § 5102(A) (West 1981), provides:
A member of the State Bar shall not accept professional employment
without first disclosing his relation, if any, with the adverse party, and
his interest, if any, in the subject matter of the employment. A member
of the State Bar who accepts employment under this rule shall first obtain the client's written consent to such employment.
66. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076 (West 1974 & Supp. 1981). Rule 5-102 of the
California Rules of Professional Conduct, as presently written, would seem to be sufficient to prescribe Lawyer II's course of conduct when faced with a consultative conflict. It would be a simple task, in any event, to modify Rule 5-102 to encompass
specifically the consultative conflict.
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in the litigation process. The Gibson model is not unique in
that regard. The law of malicious prosecution may be of some
comfort to Lawyer II where the suit brought against Lawyer II
is thoroughly groundless. The possibility of exposure to suits
which are not groundless, but will prove ultimately non-meritorious, however, is a professional risk that attaches to the
practice of law in general and in undertaking specific representation of any particular client. 7
Thus, Lawyer II's concern over being sued by Lawyer I is
not sufficient, by itself, to justify the Gibson rule precluding
such a suit. Indeed, the Gibson majority's decision was not
based on any concern for Lawyer II's interest in avoiding
Lawyer I's cross-claim; rather it was based on fear that Lawyer II's interest would interfere with the performance of his
duty to the client. In other words, it is implicit in the Gibson
rationale (and not disputed here) that Lawyer II's interest in
avoiding a suit is not as important as the client's interest in
obtaining competent professional legal services. Lawyer II's
interest in avoiding Lawyer I's cross-claim is only relevant if
the threat of such a cross-claim actually creates a consultative
conflict which can only be avoided by precluding the crossclaim. While the Gibson majority concluded that such a threat
does exist, the analysis below belies that conclusion.
C.

The Client

The client has two basic interests which must be protected. First, the client desires the best advice possible from
Lawyer II. To insure that such advice will be received, it is
necessary to minimize or eliminate (if possible) any potential
conflict of interest which might interfere with Lawyer II's
duty to the client. Second, after the decision is made to sue
Lawyer I, the client desires to obtain the maximum possible
recovery. While Gibson purports to protect these interests by
removing the possible barrier of Lawyer II's self-interest, the
rule of Gibson actually makes matters worse for the client.
The Gibson majority assumed that by precluding Lawyer
67. As with the physician in the medical-legal distinction of Held, Lawyer II in
Gibson can avoid actual liability to any party by performing Lawyer II's duty well. It
is of no consequence to the medical-legal distinction in Held that part of Lawyer II's
duty is a full and fair disclosure of a potential conflict. Like the hypothetical physician in Held, Lawyer II cannot avoid groundless lawsuits. That professional risk attaching to the practice of law also attaches to the practice.of medicine.
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I's cross-complaint against Lawyer II, Lawyer II would not be
tempted by self-interest to give short shrift to the client's interest. In fact, the consultative conflict persists despite the
Gibson ruling. 8 Although the effect of precluding Lawyer I's
cross-complaint in Gibson was to eliminate the possibility of
exposing Lawyer II to suit if Lawyer II chooses to recommend
suit against Lawyer I, Gibson did not eliminate the problem
of consultative conflict. Instead, it merely changes the focus of
Lawyer II's self-interest from avoidance of Lawyer I's crossclaim to (1) avoidance of Lawyer I's defensive use of Lawyer
II's negligence and (2) avoidance of a later malpractice suit by
the client. The Gibson majority's analysis was faulty in its
failure to consider these other self-interests of Lawyer II and
their impact on the client.
Lawyer II's desire to avoid Lawyer I's defensive use of

Lawyer II's negligence, and the potential of a malpractice suit
by the client, differs little from his desire to avoid Lawyer I's
cross-complaint. At most, Lawyer II's concern over the crosscomplaint may be more immediate, since the cross-claim
68. See The Attorney's Right, supra note 6, at 176. The refusal in Gibson to
allow the Lawyer I cross-complaint does solve the problem of Lawyer II's use of privileged information in defense of that cross-complaint. If the cross-complaint were allowed, Lawyer II, under existing rules, would not, absent client waiver, be permitted
to use privileged information gained in the course of a professional relationship with
the client to defend against that cross-complaint. Jeffery v. Pounds, 67 Cal. App. 3d
6, 136 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1977). Lawyer II's defense would consequently be seriously
handicapped because many, if not all, of the facts pertinent to Lawyer II's defense
may be privileged. Under the Gibson ruling, on the other hand, any suit against Lawyer II would have to be brought directly by the client. In this situation, Lawyer II
would be unconstrained in the use of privileged information because of the waiver of
privilege inherent in a suit brought by a client against that client's attorney. CAL.
EVID. CODE § 958 (West 1966).
Perhaps the solution is to put the client to an election. If Lawyer I's cross-complaint against Lawyer II is successful, Lawyer II will be forced to pay a portion of the
judgment. The result from the client's standpoint will be the same as if he had sued
both lawyers and waived the privilege: the client will have a full recovery. Likewise,
Lawyer II will be in the same position as if the client had sued him and waived the
privilege: he will have a judgment against him. Thus, it does not seem unfair to require the client either to waive the privilege or assume responsibility in the present
suit (on an imputed negligence theory) for any judgment against Lawyer II. In other
words, the client can choose to preserve the privilege at the expense of being able to
recover from Lawyer I only that portion of the damages caused by Lawyer I's
negligence.
In any event, consideration of attorney-client privilege issues provides little support for the Gibson exception to the historic AMA shift toward allowance of crosscomplaints for partial indemnity.
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would require the expenditure of defense costs by Lawyer II.69
In any event, however, Lawyer II is faced with a consultative conflict in advising the client, even if the potential crossclaim of Lawyer I is prohibited. Analysis of the problem,
therefore, must focus on which of the potential conflicts is
least detrimental to the client. In this context, it is necessary,
of course, to find an effective approach for encouraging Lawyer II to set aside his self-interest in advising his client.
Under the Gibson rule precluding Lawyer I's cross-complaint, Lawyer I can be expected to defend against the client's
claim by asserting the negligence of Lawyer 11.70 If Lawyer I
successfully limits liability to the client on this theory, the client's recovery from Lawyer I will be diminished. Whether or
not Lawyer I succeeds, the client will be alerted to the potential malpractice claim (and the predicate for it) against Lawyer II.
Where the Lawyer I cross-complaint is prohibited, the client can obtain complete recovery for all injuries only by
choosing one of the following courses: (1) join Lawyer II as a
defendant in the present suit against Lawyer I, or (2) wait for
the outcome of the present suit against Lawyer I, and then, if
necessary, bring suit for malpractice against Lawyer I in a
separate action. Unfortunately, neither of these alternatives
provides much comfort to the client.
Under the first alternative, the client is forced to replace
Lawyer II, thereby incurring, to a limited extent, a third set of
attorney's fees.7 1 While this circumstance is not pleasant for
the client, it is not very different from the situation the client
faces if the Lawyer I cross-complaint is permitted. If the
cross-complaint is filed against Lawyer II, it will usually be in
the client's best interest to discharge Lawyer II. Thus, if the
client wants to assure complete recovery in one action, it
makes little or no difference whether the Lawyer I cross-complaint is permitted.
69. Whether Lawyer II is attacked directly (by Lawyer I's cross-complaint) or
indirectly (by Lawyer I's defensive use of negligence) similar problems are faced with
regard to possible recusal. See note 15 supra.
70. See the discussion of Lawyer I's defensive use of Lawyer II's negligence
based on agency principles at note 66 supra and accompanying text.
71. Arguably, those fees would not be as extensive as if Lawyer II continued to
represent the client and the client had to hire Lawyer III to handle a later, separate
action.
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The second alternative, however, creates a greater detriment to the client. If, in the absence of the Lawyer I crosscomplaint, the client decides not to jettison Lawyer II in the
present suit and Lawyer I is successful in diminishing the client's recovery by the amount of Lawyer II's negligence, then
the client can recover fully only by bringing a separate suit for
malpractice against Lawyer II. From the client's point of view
this is undesirable in two respects. First, the institution of a
separate suit against Lawyer II, as opposed to treating the entire three-way problem in a single proceeding, is obviously
costly. 72 Second, the client faces the possibility of inconsistent
results in the separate lawsuits. In the first suit Lawyer I may
succeed in diminishing the client's recovery by the percentage
of Lawyer II's negligence, while in a separate action Lawyer II
may be successful in escaping all or part of the potential liability. 73 In that eventuality, the client would gain only a par72. A further client problem with the Gibson result is that the possibility of
settlement is diminished where all parties concerned are not present in a single
proceeding.
73. The possibility of inconsistent findings concerning Lawyer II's negligence or
percentage thereof is a function of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The issue is
whether or not, assuming Lawyer II was not a party to the client-Lawyer I litigation,
Lawyer II nonetheless is in a "sufficiently close" relationship with the client and the
issues litigated in the prior litigation so as to warrant under due process standards
the application of the collateral estoppel doctrine against Lawyer II. See Clemmer v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 587 P.2d 1098, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1979), which
states;
In the context of collateral estoppel, due process requires that the party
to be estopped must have had an identity or community of interest with,
and adequate representation by, the losing party in the first action as
well as that the circumstances must have been such that the party to be
estopped should reasonably have expected to be bound by the prior
adjudication.
Id. at 875, 587 P.2d at 1102, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 289. In the Gibson fact situation, the
question is whether Lawyer II (not a party to the action) will be bound in a later
action by a finding that Lawyer II's negligence was a cause of the client's loss. No
California decision has been found applying collateral estoppel in the context of the
problems here under discussion. Presumably, both the client and Lawyer II (whether
or not representing the client in the litigation against Lawyer I), as well as any lawyer
succeeding Lawyer 1I, will urge the non-negligence of Lawyer II in order to prevent a
diminution of the client's recovery. Whether or not this meets the community of interest and adequacy of representation criteria quoted above is an open question.
Also unresolved is the question of whether the client can use the doctrine of
collateral estoppel affirmatively against Lawyer II. Recent decisions seem to signal an
increasingly expansive view toward offensive use of collateral estoppel. Nevertheless,
those decisions differ from the situation under discussion here, in that they have generally involved plaintiffs who were not parties to the prior action and defendants who
were parties to the prior action. E.g., Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S.
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tial recovery.
By contrast, if the Lawyer I cross-complaint is permitted,
the two primary deterrents to suit by the client, unawareness
and inertia, are overcome to a great extent. When Lawyer I
files the cross-complaint, the client is immediately alerted to
possible claims against Lawyer II. Client inertia would be

somewhat diminished by the fact that a separate lawsuit, and
its incumbent costs and inconvenience, could be avoided if
74
Lawyer II was joined in the initial lawsuit against Lawyer 1.
Thus, the Gibson rule precluding Lawyer I's cross-complaint prejudices a client more than it helps. While the client

may ultimately be reimbursed fully under the Gibson rule for
the negligence of both Lawyer I and Lawyer II, the cost to the
client may be prohibitive. A second lawsuit may be required
with a third set of lawyers. Moreover, if under the law of collateral estoppel, inconsistent findings could result, the client
may not be adequately compensated. Accordingly, the client's
interests are better served if the Gibson rule is overturned and
the Lawyer I cross-complaint permitted.
The only remaining question, from the client's stand-

point, is how to protect against the effect of the consultative
conflict.7 5 In fact, the effect of the consultative conflict on the
client is no different than the effect on the client of any other

conflict of interest facing a lawyer representing a client. The
lawyer has a duty to discloseo fully to the client any interest
322 (1979); Crawford v. Ranger Ins. Co., 653 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1981); G.A.F. Corp.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
To the extent that any of these questions remain open, there is a risk that the
doctrine will not be applied and the client could, therefore, be subject to inconsistent
adjudications and a failure to be made whole.
74. Obviously these deterrents to client action may also be overcome, although
probably to a lesser degree, if Lawyer I asserts Lawyer II's negligence by way of a
comparative negligence defense against the client.
75. As discussed at text accompanying notes 71 & 72 supra, a consultative conflict exists regardless of whether the Lawyer I cross-complaint is permitted. One possible way of avoiding the conflict and encouraging Lawyer II to be more frank with
the client even in the face of Lawyer I's potential cross-complaint, is modification of
the rules relating to attorney fee awards. In the Gibson model, it is Lawyer II's concern with the burden of defending the cross-claim (and not the threat of actual liability) which supposedly creates the consultative conflict. It would be a relatively simple
matter (though admittedly a break from tradition) for the legislature to fashion a rule
awarding attorney's fees to Lawyer II in the event Lawyer I is not successful in prosecuting the cross-claim. Such a rule would seem to be far better than the Gibson
court's decision to abandon the principles of equitable loss distribution in the Gibson
situation.
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that the lawyer may have in the subject matter of the representation as to which there is a potential conflict.
In the Gibson factual model, prior to Lawyer II making a
recommendation to the client either to bring action against
Lawyer I or to pursue other alternatives, Lawyer II would
have a duty to inform the client of (1) the possibility of a
cross-claim by Lawyer I against Lawyer II, (2) the possibility
that Lawyer I will allege Lawyer II negligence as a defense to
the suit, and (3) that if either (1) or (2) occur, the client will
have to decide whether to discontinue the services of Lawyer
II and whether to sue Lawyer II in the same or separate action. If Lawyer II fails to disclose these possible conflicts of
interest, then the client may have a malpractice claim against

Lawyer

11.76

In short, the consultative conflict is no different from the
numerous mundane conflicts which lawyers face everyday and
deal with according to the well-established principles of professional responsibility.
D.

The Court System

Considerations pertaining to the court system and the administration of justice are also relevant to the Gibson question. In the pre-Gibson climate it was likely that the tripartite
controversy among Lawyer I, Lawyer II and the client would
be resolved at one sitting. If Lawyer I was sued, Lawyer I
could bring a cross-complaint in that suit against Lawyer II.
Indeed, if Lawyer I was ever going to raise the issue of Lawyer
II's negligence, it would likely be in the same action in which
Lawyer I was sued.
In the post-Gibson milieu, Lawyer I is precluded from
bringing a cross-complaint, but can raise the alleged Lawyer II
negligence as a defense against the client. At that stage, the
client is faced with a choice. The client can join Lawyer II in
the suit against Lawyer I and the controversy can again be
resolved in a single proceeding. The client may, however,
choose to embrace Lawyer II in spite of the negligence allegations and continue to retain Lawyer II in the suit against
76. See note 55 supra for a discussion of the statute of limitations in attorney
malpractice actions and the diminished consequences of the client remaining unaware
of any claims the client may have against Lawyer I.
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Lawyer I." If the client chooses this alternative, should Lawyer I win, any subsequent claims of the client against Lawyer
II necessitate a second and separate suit, perhaps following
protracted and expensive appeals of the initial case against
Lawyer I. The requirement of a second suit imposes an undue
burden on the court system. Taxpayers would pay the cost of
two lawsuits, including appeals, rather than one, in what is
essentially a single controversy. Other litigants would suffer
corresponding additional delays. Further, and finally, if the
client refuses to join Lawyer II in the first lawsuit, settlement
negotiations would be hampered by the absence in the negotiations of one member of the tripartite relationship. Accordingly, the strong public policy favoring out of court settlements suggests that the Gibson result is counter-productive.
VII.

CONCLUSION

An adversarial system of justice requires that the attorney-client relationship be protected from potentially destructive conflicts of interest. This article has focused on one such
conflict of interest, the consultative conflict presented by the
Gibson case. Analysis of the Gibson decision has shown that
its solution to the consultative conflict is both ineffective and
excessive: refusal to allow a cross-complaint for partial indemnity between lawyers does not prevent the consultative conflict from arising.
A more reasonable remedy would be to handle the consultative conflict within the framework of the present Rules of
Professional Conduct. Under those rules, full and frank disclosure between attorney and client provides the ultimate protection for the attorney-client relationship. Furthermore,
avoidance of Gibson's harsh remedy is more in keeping with
the strong public policy, expressed in AMA, of distributing
loss according to fault.

77. See note 15 supra for a discussion of the possible requirement that Lawyer
II be recused from the lawsuit if Lawyer II is to be called as a witness adverse to the
client in that suit.

